F irst, in the spirit of the age, I must start with some disclaimers. I write as a mere lawyer, and I am very conscious that the matter under consideration is one that has to engage the assistance of many disciplines. Moreover, I have spent the whole of my professional life in the courtroom, first as a barrister and now as a judge. So that my perspective inevitably reflects my forensic experience, though the subject extends far beyond that rather narrow context. Finally, and I know this will be disappointing to you, I have no solutions or even suggestions as to how the interests of our children can be better represented. My more modest task is to explain why it is so important that we make sure that our children are properly represented and to identify a few areas where our present arrangements are perhaps not always as satisfactory as they should be. My survey is partial and slanted, reflecting in major part the problems that the happenstance of litigation has brought my way.
I must start with the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Act is of fundamental, indeed almost revolutionary, importance. For the first time it confers upon the citizen and the denizen legally enforceable constitutional and human rights. You may be surprised to hear me say it, but at common law there is no such thing as a constitutional right, using the term in what the legal philosophers would consider its only proper meaning. What we traditionally refer to as our constitutional rights are more correctly described as liberties, privileges or freedoms. Those of a jurisprudential turn of mind will recognise the reference here to Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions at p 47. Now this is not some arid piece of legal pedantry. It is a point of great importance. Traditionally our constitutional and human rights fell into two broad categories. First, there were "rights" -in truth, liberties, privileges or freedoms -such as freedom of speech and freedom of association. At common law, freedom of speech was founded on nothing more than the principle that, absent some specific prohibition imposed, for example, by the law of libel or the law of obscenity, a man is free to write and say what he wants. So with freedom of religion and freedom of association. These were not rights enforceable by action in the courts -which indeed is why they were not rights at all in strict legal theory. Secondly, there were rights properly so called, where infringements of the right, because it involved a correlative breach by someone else of a legal duty, gave rise to an action, typically an action in tort. So if a man's house was unlawfully searched or he was assaulted by agents of the state an action in trespass lay, just as it would against any other tortfeasor.
Please do not misunderstand me. Our old constitutional settlement served us remarkably well. Generations of our ancestors were blessed that they did not have to apply to some government office to seek permission to publish a newspaper or to set up some association of like-minded people. As the great legal historian Maitland once remarked, speaking of the religious liberty granted to barely tolerated sects (Selected Essays at p 183): "All that they had to ask from the state was that the open preaching of their doctrines should not be unlawful." And generations have cause to be grateful that every Minister of the King, however powerful, could always be brought to account in a court of law if he broke, or caused his minions to break, the law.
But the fact is that the old constitutional settlement had its limitations.
In the first place, whilst it may have obliged the state not to interfere in certain activities -at least not unless the state could obtain Parliamentary authority to do so -it imposed no positive obligations on the state. Secondly, it tended to protect the citizen from official wrongdoing only if that wrongdoing could be brought within the ambit of either the criminal law or the law of tort. Thus the law protected the citizen from false imprisonment -a man unlawfully held in a prison could obtain a writ of habeas corpus and sue for damages for false imprisonment -but gave him little remedy against being detained lawfully but in degrading conditions. And the Secretary of State could only be held liable for those for whose acts he was vicariously liable. So a prisoner who was assaulted by a prison officer could sue the Home Secretary; a prisoner who was assaulted by another prisoner could not. To an extent these difficulties could be overcome by extensions of the law of negligence or by that surprisingly recent development, the public law administered by the Administrative Court. But these were in many ways inadequate.
Our public law in particular was crippled by its identification of rationality as the benchmark of the legality of decision-making by public authorities. Whilst European jurisprudence was developing proportionality as the test of legality, so long as the so-called Wednesbury test of rationality held sway in our domestic courts, the decision of a public authority could be struck down by our courts only if it was "so outrageous in [its] defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it" (Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at p 410).
The importance of the Human Rights Act is not merely that it makes the Convention directly enforceable in our domestic courts. It confers rights in the strict sense of the word: rights matched by the correlative obligation, imposed on every public authority by section 6 of the Act and backed up by the remedies granted by sections 7 and 8 of the Act, not to act, or fail to act, in a way which is incompatible with Convention rights. It confers rights which in many cases oblige the state -public authoritiesto take positive action. And it introduces proportionality as the benchmark of legality when the state is proposing to act in a manner which engages a Convention right.
For present purposes the most important provision in the Convention is Article 8 which, as you all know, protects "the right to respect for … private and family life". Article 8(2) provides that: provided for in the Convention and that it is "necessary in a democratic society". That is to say, the reasons given must be "relevant and sufficient", they must correspond to a "pressing social need" and must be "proportionate" to the legitimate aim being pursued (Hale LJ in Re W and B, Re W (Care Plan) I should also refer to Article 3 which, without qualification or exception, prohibits "torture or … inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".
STATE INTERFERENCE WITH FAMILY LIFE
It may be convenient at this point to consider two different types of reason why the state may seek to interfere with family life. Let me give three examples. The state seeks to send the mother of a baby to prison. Or the state seeks to deport a convicted drug smuggler or failed asylum seeker who has a wife and child in this country, in circumstances where it may be difficult or even impossible for his wife and child to follow him abroad. Or the state, in the form of a local authority, seeks an interim care order placing a child in foster-care. Now in each case the consequence to the child of the state's threatened activity may be the same -separation from his or her parent -but what the state is actually doing is not at all the same in all three cases.
In the first and second cases the analysis is simple and obvious: the state is seeking to do something which involves an interference in family life but is doing so in pursuit of its own ends -in pursuit of the public interest; specifically, the interest of the state -the public interestto use the language of Article 8(2) in "public safety" or "the prevention of disorder or crime". In cases of this kind both the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the decisions of our domestic courts are at one: the interests of the child, although they plainly have to be taken into account, are neither paramount nor primary. There is a balancing exercise in which the scales start even (see the authorities discussed in Re A (Care Proceedings: Asylum Seekers) But in the third case -the care proceedings -something different is going on. Because, subject only to meeting what family lawyers call 'threshold', both our domestic lawsection 1(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989 -and the Strasbourg jurisprudence give priority to the child's best interests (see sections 31(2) and 38(2) of the Children Act 1989; note that there is no threshold requirement when the proceedings relate to a mentally incompetent adult: Re S (Adult Patient) (Inherent Jurisdiction: Family Life) [2002] EWHC 2278 (Fam), [2003] When we think of Article 8 we tend to think of it as a protection against the serious interference in a parent's right to respect for family life which occurs when the state -often in the guise of a local authority -seeks compulsorily to separate parent and child. Such an interference by the state in the internal life of a family is a very serious matter. After all, the family, whatever form it takes, is the bedrock of our society and the foundation of our way of life.
But the parents' rights to respect for their family life are only a part, even if a very important part, of the picture. Parent and child both have rights protected by Article 8, and Article 8 protects the right to respect for both "private" and "family" life. Private life is not the same as family life and the two may sometimes come into conflict. In particular, the parent's right to respect for his or her family life may come into conflict with the child's rights to respect both for his or her family life and for his or her private life. Let me explain why and then move on to explain the significance of the point. [107] ). The Strasbourg jurisprudence recognises that the ability to lead one's own personal life as one chooses, the ability to develop one's personality, indeed one's very psychological and moral integrity, are dependant upon being able to interact and develop relationships with other human beings and with the world at large. Similarly, the private life protected by Article 8 extends to the emotional and developmental environment in which a child is brought up. A child's Article 8 rights may be engaged if he is being bought up in surroundings that isolate him socially or confine or stultify him emotionally. The ability to establish and develop relationships with the outside world -the ability to participate in the life of the community -is an important aspect of the "psychological integrity" protected by Article 8.
CONCEPT OF PRIVATE LIFE

DUTIES IMPOSED ON THE STATE BY ARTICLE 8
So much for family and private life. What of the duties imposed on the state by Article 8? The Strasbourg Court has long recognised -the principle goes back at least as far as Marckx v Belgium (1979-80) So what the state -the local authority -is actually doing when it seeks to take a child into care can usefully be analysed in terms of the state fulfilling the duties cast upon it by Article 8. Botta v Italy shows that the state in the form of a local authority does not merely have the power to commence care proceedings under section 31 of the Children Act; it may in certain circumstances be under a duty to do so. Now you may not think the analysis is useful, and in terms of day to day practice it probably is not. After all, we simply apply sections 31 and 38 of the Children Act without asking -without needing to ask -what precisely it is that we are doing. But when the case involves not a child but a mentally incapacitated adult, the analysis is more useful. As you will know, the consequence of historical anomaly and a historical mistake is that the only jurisdiction available in the case of a mentally incapacitated adult is the court's [2002] EWHC 18 (Fam/Admin), [2002] it is that the court is actually doing in such a case and also why it is that the court must continue to develop this novel jurisdiction if it is to comply with its duty under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.
inherent declaratory jurisdiction (see A v A Health Authority, In re J (A Child), R (S) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
So much for the process by which a child enters the care system. But what of the child who has been taken into care? Here the state's -the local authority's -positive obligations are even more compelling. As Botta v Italy itself shows, the positive obligations which arise under Article 8 may be fairly limited if the complaint is that the state has simply failed to act altogether. As the court explained at para [33] :
"In order to determine whether such obligations exist, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual."
But it is much more difficult for the state to justify inaction once it has chosen to intervene and has, by its intervention, actually interfered with family life, for example, by taking a child into care.
Children are to be taken away from their parents by the state if, and only if, the conditions set out in section 31 of the Children Act are satisfied, that is, if the local authority can establish that the children have suffered or are likely to suffer significant harm as a result of parental default. The state assumes a heavy burden when it takes a child into care. If the state is to justify removing children from their parents it can only be on the basis that the state is going to provide a better quality of care than that from which the child in care has been rescued (Re F, F v Let me deal first with the children -they are in fact babies, because Prison Service policy usually requires them to be separated from their mothers no later than when they are 18 months old -who find themselves in MBUs.
There is a significant body of evidence identifying the various disadvantages to babies -particularly older babies -of living in MBUs. The fact is that even the best MBU cannot alone offer the variety that is available in the world outside prison. In the light of this material, and having regard to the principle in I refused to interfere on the merits with the Secretary of State's decision to separate nine-month old Lia-Jade and her mother Claire. Explaining why, I said (para [199] ) that the Secretary of State was fully entitled to pay particular attention to the views expressed by a number of professionals as to the desirability of Lia-Jade being able to live in a "normal" environment. In the light of Botta v Italy, I said, this was clearly a most important factor.
The other group of children in prisons -those in young offenders' institutions -are, on any view, vulnerable and needy children. Disproportionately they come from chaotic backgrounds. Many have suffered abuse or neglect. The statistics paint a deeply disturbing picture of the YOI population. They plainly need much support. In relation to some there are child protection issues. In the Howard League case at para [11] I described these children as follows: I added that, quite apart from any other remedies which there may be arising out of the state's -the Prison Service's -failure to meet its human rights obligations, sections 7 and 8 of the Human Rights Act enable a victim 6 to bring a free-standing action in the High Court and that in the case of a claimant who is a child such a claim can appropriately be brought in the Family Division.
And the implications of that were recently spelt out by Moses J in a case involving a child in a YOI who alleged breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (R (BP) Thus far I have been considering the substantive rights accorded to a child by Article 8. And thus far, you may be thinking to complain, I have had precious little to say that is relevant to the subject about which I am supposed to be speaking. But bear with me. I must now turn to another aspect of Article 8 which is perhaps more directly relevant, namely the procedural rights that are guaranteed to parents and children by Article 8.
Let me start with parents, for much of the Strasbourg and domestic case-law has focussed on their rights. Article 8 affords parents who are involved in care proceedings not merely substantive protection against any inappropriate interference with their private and family life by public authorities but also significant procedural safeguards. As the Strasbourg Court has said (McMichael v United Kingdom (1995) What does this mean in practical terms? In one case, which involved allegations of unfairness in the process leading up to the hearing of an application for a care order, I said this (Re L (Care: Assessment: Fair Trial) [2002] EWHC 1379 (Fam), [2002] In another case a local authority which held a care order was proposing to remove the children from the parents with whom they had been placed in accordance with the care plan approved by the court. Indeed in that case he quashed the decision to separate mother and baby on the ground (amongst others) that the procedure adopted "fell well short of what fairness required". One of the matters to which he drew attention at paras [28]- [29] was that "no opportunity was provided for representations to be made by [the mother] or her solicitors." I emphasise those last words.
Moreover, and this is a matter of some importance, the procedural guarantees afforded by Article 8 apply as much to the child as to his or her parents. Children are not the largely passive objects of more or less paternalistic parental, judicial, local authority or Prison Service decision-making. A child is as much entitled to the protection of the Convention -and specifically of Article 8 -as anyone else. The fairness which Article 8 guarantees to every parent is, of course, equally guaranteed to every child (Re L at para [150] , Claire F v Secretary of State at para [158] ).
Thus far I have concentrated on the implications of Article 8 for local authorities and the Prison Service. But in principle the procedural safeguards mandated by Article 8 apply to all public authorities whose actions may engage someone's Article 8 rights. However, such issues can arise in many different contexts and different contexts may call for different procedures. It may be that the demanding requirements imposed on a local authority or the Prison Service do not apply in all their full rigour to the very different context of deportation and removal. And no-one has yet suggested that a mother's children require to be represented in the Crown Court before she is sentenced to a term of imprisonment. And there may, of course, be cases of emergency or extreme urgency where it is not possible to involve parents as fully in the decision-making process as would normally be appropriate (Re G at para [58] 
